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INTRODUCTION 
Nineteen forty-eight was a pretty good year to go to the movies. Audiences 
could watch Humphrey Bogart contract gold fever in The Treasure of Sierra Madre, 
swoon over Moira Shearer’s flawless pirouettes in The Red Shoes, or laugh at their 
favorite funnymen cavorting with monsters in Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein. 
But for every hit like The Big Clock, there were scores of low-budget, often 
lowbrow films like Mr. Reckless (in which a man tries to woo his sweetie through 
“daredevil oilfield exploits”)1 and Caged Fury (in which the city is at the mercy of 
an evil lion tamer)2 that generated income to finance the more prestigious pictures. 
Indeed, prior to 1948, movie studios refused to license desirable films to theaters 
unless the theaters also took exhibition licenses, or booked, the lesser films. But 
the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in United States v. Paramount made the practice 
known as “block booking” an antitrust violation.3 Central to the Paramount Court’s 
decision was the notion that it is anticompetitive conduct to leverage the value of 
one copyrighted work to force the license or sale of another. 
In its Paramount decision, the Court extended its past holdings, which 
proscribed the tying of patented manufactured products, to nonpatented 
manufactured products. It held that compelling the sale of one copyrighted work 
with another unlawfully draws upon the monopoly power of the more desirable 
film to a less desirable film. Because the Court framed the decision in remarkably 
unbounded language, Paramount can be read to apply broadly to all copyrighted 
works. Thirteen years later, the Court extended the Paramount holding to apply to 
the licensing of films for television viewing in United States v. Loew’s Inc.4 
This Note pulls on this loose thread of the Court’s jurisprudence and 
attempts to tie it around the practices of the recording industry during the second 
half of the twentieth century. It argues that, had a case ever been brought, the 
Paramount and Loew’s decisions would have effectively damned the emerging 
practices of the recording industry as anticompetitive conduct. In the mid-
twentieth century, the long-playing record album—a collection or “block” of 
songs protected individually by copyright—became the dominant means of 
acquiring popular music. Indeed, until the intrusion of digital technology and the 
Internet some five decades later, the album—not the single—was the foundation 
of the musical economy; this Note therefore refers to these five decades as the 
“Album Era.” Innovations like iTunes gave the consumer the ability to purchase 
music in smaller units, and the resurgent popularity of the single appears to have 
 
1. Plot Summary for Mr. Reckless, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/ 
tt0040616/plotsummary (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
2. Caged Fury, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0040196 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
3. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
4. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 50 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
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vindicated the song as the appropriate unit of musical measurement. This turn of 
events also raises colorable claims that, during the Album Era, consumers would 
have preferred to purchase only one song at a time rather than the entire album, 
and therefore the recording industry perpetrated an ongoing violation of the 
antitrust laws by compelling consumers to purchase unwanted songs along with 
the more desirable ones that motivated the purchase. Although the digital era has 
largely obviated the recording industry’s ability to force consumers to accept 
(unwanted) bundled songs, this inquiry retains applicability to the present 
consumer market for copyrighted works when considering such practices as 
foreclosing a consumer’s ability to purchase certain movies without taking others 
in a film collection, or “box set.” Further, questions can be raised as to whether 
modern consumers of movies on DVD or Blu-ray are paying inflated prices for 
products that contain not just the film, but also the so-called “value added” 
material consumers must accept on the disc. Finally, one could argue that by 
forcing bundles of channels on consumers instead of allowing à la carte selections, 
cable providers effectively engage in impermissible block booking. 
Part I of this Note highlights the jurisprudence surrounding tying generally, 
block booking more specifically, and later developments in case law that could 
affect the analysis of recording industry practices. Part II offers a brief historical 
survey of the recording industry during its late twentieth-century album heyday 
and its digital disintegration. Part III applies the Court’s tying and block-booking 
jurisprudence to the recording industry’s shift from single to long-playing albums 
for pop music.5 This analysis reveals that the advent of the long-playing record in 
1948 ushered in an era of potential antitrust liability that was only corrected with 
the rise of the digital marketplace in the twenty-first century. 
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND: ANTITRUST, TYING,  
AND BLOCK BOOKING OF COPYRIGHTS 
Tying has long been held to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws. Early 
cases brought under the Sherman Act6 included suits against button-machinery 
manufacturers and printing-machine makers who forced the license or sale of 
unpatented goods with patented products.7 As the Court in Illinois Tool Works v. 
Independent Ink noted, tying arrangements were historically viewed as violations of 
four separate legal doctrines or laws: patent misuse, unfair competition under the 
 
5. Previous authors have commented on the antitrust implications of recording industry 
practices, but none has analyzed indepth whether antitrust jurisprudence supports such claims. See, 
e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Bundles of Joy: The Ubiquity and Efficiency of Bundles in New 
Technology Markets, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1, 27–30 (2009); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Music Markets 
and Mythologies, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 831, 836 (2010) (referring to “tied sales”). 
6. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)) 
(covering antitrust). 
7. See, e.g., Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912); Heaton Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. 
v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288 (6th Cir. 1896). 
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Federal Trade Commission Act,8 section 3 of the Clayton Act,9 and as a contract 
in restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act.10 For claims brought 
under any of these laws and doctrines, Justice Stevens noted that “[i]n all of those 
instances, the justification for the challenge rested on either an assumption or a 
showing that the defendant’s position of power in the market for the tying 
product was being used to restrain competition in the market for the tied 
product.”11 
As antitrust jurisprudence has evolved, courts have most commonly analyzed 
tying as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which states that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint 
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal.”12 Thus, under the broad sweep of section 1, the consumer 
of the tied products becomes a party to unlawful conduct.13 Most vertical 
restraints—that is, downstream restrictions imposed by a higher party in the 
channel of commerce—are analyzed under the “rule of reason,” which requires a 
searching analysis of the purpose and effects of the restraint before finding it 
violates antitrust law.14 In contrast, courts historically deemed tying arrangements 
to be unlawful per se, with the purpose and effect of the restrictions being 
immaterial in light of the harms to competition created by the coercive sales 
arrangement.15 Because courts could not reach such considerations under a per se 
analysis (but could under the more forgiving rule of reason analysis applied in 
other antitrust matters), per se analysis was often harsh and unforgiving; hence, 
practices subjected to per se analysis were considered “condemned.”16 
However, in recent decades the Court has softened its stance on tying claims. 
Since its 1977 decision in United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. (Fortner 
II), the Court has resisted per se condemnation of tying arrangements.17 As the 
Court stated in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, “per se 
 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
9. Id. § 14. 
10. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
11. Id. 
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Tying arrangements of commodities are also prohibited under 
section 3 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006). Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 
also prohibits tying as an unfair practice. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
13. For a thorough critique analyzing tying under section 1, see Christopher R. Leslie, 
Unilaterally Imposed Tying Arrangements and Antitrust’s Concerted Action Requirement, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1773 
(1999). 
14. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 
IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1219 (2008). 
15. See 1 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 8:2 (2012). 
16. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
17. See Ill. Tool Works Inc., 547 U.S. at 36; U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner II), 
429 U.S. 610, 622 (1977). 
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condemnation . . . is only appropriate if the existence of forcing is probable.”18 
Nevertheless, courts have retained the per se label to invalidate tying practices, but 
have softened its bite by requiring a thorough analysis of the market as well as the 
purpose and effects of the arrangement.19 This analysis is more consonant with 
the rule of reason approach.20 Prior to the Illinois Tool Works decision in 2006, the 
Court presumed that companies holding patents or copyrights held sufficient 
market power to force a sale, effectively rendering all tying of works protected by 
intellectual property law per se violations of the Sherman Act. Post-Illinois Tool 
Works, that presumption of market power has been eliminated in favor of a case-
by-case analysis of whether the intellectual property rights holder actually enjoys 
sufficient market power to force the consumer into accepting the arrangement. 
The modern test for tying, as enunciated in Jefferson Parish, requires (1) an 
assessment as to whether there are in fact two separate products in two separate 
markets being tied, (2) whether there is coercion or conditioning that compels a 
consumer’s decision to purchase the tied products, (3) whether the defendant has 
sufficient market power in the tying product market,21 and (4) whether there is a 
not-insubstantial effect on interstate commerce in the tied product market affected 
by the arrangement.22 
A. The Block-Booking Cases 
The Paramount and Loew’s decisions established block booking as a per se 
form of tying that violated the antitrust laws. The Paramount Court emphasized 
parallels with patent law, upholding the lower court’s prohibition on tying and 
citing to the lower court’s reasoning relying on the principle that “the owner of a 
patent [is forbidden] to condition its use on the purchase or use of patented or 
unpatented materials.”23 Drawing a connection to patent misuse, Justice Douglas 
explained the Supreme Court’s reasoning in proscribing the tying practice: “It is 
said that reward to the author or artist [from intellectual property rights] serves to 
induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius. But the reward 
does not serve its public purpose if it is not related to the quality of the 
copyright.”24 In other words, the very purpose of the copyright grant would be 
adulterated by block booking, which resulted in studios generating lower budget 
 
18. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15. 
19. This shift is particularly evident in a case central to this inquiry, Broad. Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). 
20. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 28–29 (finding no per se tying arrangement after ten pages 
of searching factual analysis). 
21. The Fortner II Court defined market power as “the power, within the market for the tying 
product, to raise prices or to require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be 
exacted in a completely competitive market.” Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620. 
22. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 8. 
23. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948). 
24. Id. at 158. 
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(and often lower quality) films to pad out licensing contracts. The Paramount Court 
noted that 
[t]he practice tends to equalize rather than differentiate the reward for the 
individual copyrights. Even where all the films included in the package 
are of equal quality, the requirement that all be taken if one is desired 
increases the market for some. Each stands not on its own footing but in 
whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have.25 
In other words, the Court held that each copyright must fend for itself in the 
market, or risk antitrust condemnation. 
The Paramount Court concluded that film studios were free to release their 
films in blocks, so long as they were offered at the exhibitor’s option, stating that 
“[a]ll we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless 
another copyright is accepted.”26 For the purposes of this Note, it is important to 
highlight that, although the Court may only have contemplated that its holding 
would apply in the film exhibition context, the block-booking holding, read 
literally, applies to all copyrighted works. 
Thirteen years later, the Court revisited block booking in the context of 
licensing theatrical releases to television stations in United States v. Loew’s.27 The 
practice was the same as it had been in the theatrical context, with Justice Fortas 
noting that to license “Treasure of the Sierra Madre, Casablanca, Johnny Belinda, Sergeant 
York, and The Man Who Came to Dinner, among others, [a Plaintiff station] also had 
to take such films as Nancy Drew Troubleshooter, Tugboat Annie Sails Again, Kid 
Nightingale, Gorilla Man, and Tear Gas Squad.”28 Once again, the Court rejected the 
practice. Here it found that, although the theatrical films competing with original 
TV programming comprised less than eight percent of television programming, 
each film’s market power imbued by its copyright was not diminished: 
The district judge found that each copyrighted film block booked by 
appellants for television use “was in itself a unique product”; that feature 
films “varied in theme, in artistic performance, in stars, in audience 
appeal, etc.,” and were not fungible; and that since each defendant by reason 
of its copyright had a “monopolistic” position as to each tying product, “sufficient 
economic power” to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition 
in the tied product was present . . . .29 
By delving deeper into the tying analysis as applied to copyrights and block 
booking, the Loew’s Court significantly muddied the waters. On the one hand, the 
Loew’s Court recognized that each work is unique and a product of the skill and 
 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 159. 
27. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. 
Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
28. Id. at 41–42. 
29. Id. at 48 (emphasis added). 
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talent that went into its making. Indeed, in a famous footnote immediately 
following the excerpted passage above, the Court noted the impropriety of 
“forcing a television station which wants Gone With The Wind to take Getting Gertie’s 
Garter as well as taking undue advantage of the fact that to television as well as 
motion picture viewers there is but one Gone With The Wind.”30 But on the other 
hand, the Court expressly stated that it was the copyright itself, a government-given 
credential, that granted the tying product its monopoly power.31 It was this latter 
aspect of the Court’s holding that survived—the Court’s previous recognition of 
the varying levels of audience appeal various films might enjoy seemed to be cast 
aside in this opinion—and the “by reason of its copyright” reasoning became 
ingrained in the common law as the presumption of market power accorded to 
copyrighted works.32 
The advantages of block booking were clearly evident to the studios, as the 
practice facilitated price discrimination—that is, “a method of selling calculated to 
extract larger sums than otherwise would be possible.”33 The studios also relied 
upon their ability to leverage the successes and failures of block-booked films 
together for budgeting and production purposes; the revenues received from a B 
picture like Caged Heat were pooled and applied toward more prestigious 
productions like Sierra Madre.34 Nonetheless, the Paramount and Loew’s Courts 
found the proffered justifications that block booking was integral to studios’ 
finances unavailing.35 The industry’s dependence on the practice was no excuse 
for antitrust violation. 
Under the block-booking cases, then, any copyrighted work could become a 
tying product simply by virtue of the market power inherent in its own 
copyright.36 The market power presumption accorded to copyrighted works 
endured until Illinois Tool Works forty-four years later. Moreover, although the 
Loew’s decision seems to be limited to motion picture works, the Court’s broader 
holding in Paramount (“All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more 
copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.”)37 seems applicable to all 
copyrighted works, film or otherwise. 
 
30. Id. at 56 n.6. 
31. Id. at 48. 
32. See Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 38–42 (2006). 
33. George J. Stigler, United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking, 1963 SUP. CT. 
REV. 152, 153 (1963). 
34. See JOHN FAWELL, THE HIDDEN ART OF HOLLYWOOD: IN DEFENSE OF THE STUDIO 
ERA FILM 3 (2008) (“When the studio had control of theaters and could block book . . . they had the 
freedom to take a loss on a film here or there.”); see also BRIAN GREENBERG & LINDA C. WATTS, 1 
THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 329 (2009). 
35. Loew’s, 371 U.S. at 50; United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948). 
36. See 2 WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 36:5 
(2012) (“[P]arties asserting claims of copyright tying or compulsory block booking were greatly 
helped . . . if the tying item was either patented or copyrighted.”). 
37. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 159. 
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B. The Blanket License: Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System 
Two decades later, the Court contemplated block booking in a different 
context: for the blanket musical performance license. In Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System (BMI), the Court reviewed the practices of the 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) and Broadcast 
Music, Inc. (BMI), the agencies that handled the licensing of musical 
performances.38 Both ASCAP and BMI serve as clearing houses for copyright 
owners, who grant the organizations the “nonexclusive rights to license 
nondramatic performances of their works” to broadcasters, producers, venue 
owners, and anyone else seeking the right to use copyrighted music in their 
ventures.39 The organizations used blanket licenses to serve these interests. The 
blanket licenses “give the licensees the right to perform any and all of the 
compositions owned by the members . . . as often as the licensees desire for a 
stated term,” and fees were determined as a percentage of revenue or a negotiated 
flat fee.40 
Within two decades of its 1914 founding, ASCAP was already facing criminal 
charges by the Justice Department for anticompetitive conduct, scrutiny that 
evolved into a series of consent decrees that not only limited the conduct of 
ASCAP, but also that of later-comer BMI.41 From these decrees emerged the 
contours of the licensing organizations’ contemporary practices: BMI and ASCAP 
could sell the blanket licenses on nonexclusive bases while preserving the option of 
direct artist negotiations for individual licenses. Under these consent decrees, the 
party seeking the license must be offered “a genuine economic choice between the 
per-program license and the . . . blanket license.”42 
Its decades of subscribing to the blanket license notwithstanding, Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) brought a challenge to the blanket license in the mid-
1970s, claiming that BMI and ASCAP “are unlawful monopolies and that the 
blanket license is illegal price fixing, an unlawful tying arrangement, a concerted 
refusal to deal, and a misuse of copyrights.”43 The trial court found that because 
direct negotiation with the copyright holders was still feasible, there was no tying, 
restraint of trade, refusal to deal, or monopolization.44 Thus, the BMI Court 
effectively rejected CBS’s claim that the blanket license was tantamount to block 
booking or tying so long as there remained “real choice” in one’s ability to acquire 
the rights to individual copyrights in addition to the availability of the blanket 
license. 
 
38. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. (BMI ), 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979). 
39. Id. at 5. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. at 10–14. 
42. Id. at 11. 
43. Id. at 6. 
44. Id. 
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Having set aside the question of tying, the Supreme Court then took up the 
issue of whether the blanket license itself was horizontal price fixing among 
competitors (that is, copyright owners competing for airplay), and found that, 
considering the difficulties and inefficiencies involved in attempting to meet the 
various would-be licensee’s needs through direct negotiations with copyright 
holders—an option still available to the applicants, the Court hastened to add—“a 
blanket license was an obvious necessity.”45 The Court concluded that because the 
blanket license is a “whole . . . truly greater than the sum of its parts[,] it is . . . a 
different product,” and because “agreement on price is necessary to market the 
product,” per se condemnation was inappropriate.46 
The theory that a blanket license is permissible so long as individual licenses 
are obtainable was tested in F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 
published shortly after the BMI decision was handed down.47 There, the district 
court found that because a copyright holder of customized Catholic hymnals 
refused to license individual hymns, the putative license he offered was in fact 
block booking of copyrights.48 The Seventh Circuit reversed in an unpublished 
decision that held that because churches had other means of acquiring the hymns 
outside of the customized hymnals, the license was permissible under BMI.49 
Consequently, the line between block booking and blanket licensing seems to be 
drawn at the point where alternate means of securing licenses or sales of other 
copyrighted works is not a “real choice” for the consumer.50 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A brief history lesson about the practices of the music and recording 
industries during the second half of the twentieth century will establish a basis for 
application of the legal doctrines discussed above, and reveals an ongoing tension 
between technological innovation and consumer preference. Post-World War II 
culture was marked by the consumer’s growing love of home entertainment 
technology. The phonograph, the radio, the television, the audio cassette, home 
gaming systems, the VCR, and the compact disc formed a steady progression that 
seemed to point to the Internet and what once was called “convergence”—the 
concept of a seamless interface between user need and digital delivery of 
 
45. Id. at 20. 
46. Id. at 21–24. 
47. F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 506 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1981), rev’d, 
No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 19198 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1982). 
48. Id. at 1136. 
49. F.E.L. Publ’ns, No. 81-1333, 1982 WL 19198, at *10 (7th Cir. Mar. 25, 1982). 
50. BMI, 441 U.S at 24. But see Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 769 
(D. Del. 1981) (finding blanket licenses a necessity even while acknowledging that neither individual 
licenses nor creation of more limited licenses were realistic possibilities for small and independent 
licensees like the bar owners bringing the antitrust counterclaim in that action), aff’d, 691 F.2d 490 (3d 
Cir. 1982). 
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information, entertainment, and utility.51 For forty-five years, the continuing 
progression of innovation was a boon to the recording industry and the rise of 
popular music. But, the years that followed—the years of Internet ascendance and 
dominance—were less kind to the recording industry as it lost its tight grip on the 
album as the dominant unit of musical measurement. 
A. The Music Industry, 1948–1999 
Prior to 1948, the 78 revolutions-per-minute (RPM) record was the only 
means of listening to recorded phonographic music,52 and had been so for 
decades. Although early sound recordings were pressed at a variety of recording 
speeds ranging from 60 to 130 RPM, by 1925 the 78 RPM shellac record, boasting 
up to three minutes of recorded sound on each side, had established its 
dominance.53 The limiting effects of the 78 RPM record affected the artists—
whose compositions had to be short or required listener effort to continue the 
song on another record side—as well as retailers and consumers, who had to 
transport, display, and ultimately store at home bulky “albums” (literally bound, 
book-like collections of records) of 78s to enable listening to longer musical 
works.54 A typical symphonic work could stretch to three or more records, 
totaling six sides of music.55 But, none of this deterred postwar consumers from 
enjoying the thrill of music in the comfort of their own homes; historian Gary 
Marmorstein notes that “more than $200 million worth of records were sold” in 
1947—an all-time industry high.56 
The year 1948—ironically, the same year the Supreme Court decided block 
booking was illegal—also saw the advent of the long-playing 33 ⅓ RPM record. 
The long-playing record was the latest move in an ongoing rivalry between 
entertainment technology pioneers RCA and Columbia, which were fighting a 
multifront war for media dominance via radio, television, and home audio 
recordings.57 RCA had one-upped Columbia and its lead engineer Peter Goldmark 
by introducing the color-wheel television system; the long-playing record was 
 
51. See, e.g., TV on Your Phone, ECONOMIST ( Jan. 13, 2005), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/3566995; Mark Jones, Preaching to the Convergence Choir, INFOWORLD (Jan. 17, 2003), http:// 
www.infoworld.com/t/networking/preaching-convergence-choir-256. 
52. This is distinct from music reproduced from piano rolls, another popular means of 
enjoying recorded music at home. See GEOFFREY HULL, THE RECORDING INDUSTRY 46 (2d ed. 
2004) (noting that 342,000 player pianos were sold during peak years). 
53. Gramophone Record, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gramophone_record (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
54. LP Record, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LP_record (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
55. See, for example, the four-record set comprising RCA Victor Album DM-156, a recording 
of the London Symphony Orchestra performing Beethoven’s Fourth Piano Concerto (released in 
1940). Victor Musical Masterpieces Listing, http://www.78rpmcommunity.com/documents/6/20/rca-
victor-m-series-78rpm-albums (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
56. GARY MARMORSTEIN, THE LABEL 160 (2007). 
57. See generally id. at 153, 160–64. 
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Columbia’s—and Goldmark’s—revenge on their rival.58 The prize in this latest 
battle between RCA and Columbia would be the lucrative classical music market. 
Indeed, the roughly twenty-two-minute-per-side recording length of what became 
known (thanks to Columbia’s trademark on the long-playing album) as the “LP” 
was purposed to “hold nearly any movement of existing Columbia classical 
recordings on a single side.”59 As historian Gary Marmorstein notes, the pop 
music market was not a consideration in the development of the long-playing 
record; “for pop music listeners, the 78 worked fine, thank you.”60 
Meanwhile, RCA was about to introduce the 45 RPM single in its bid for 
dominance of the very pop market Columbia was ignoring. RCA saw the 45 as a 
lighter, better quality, and more user-friendly version of the single-song music 
format that already appealed to pop music consumers.61 The company 
accompanied the introduction of the format with a mechanism that enabled 
record players to drop new songs onto the spindle in just three seconds—an 
efficiency that “went a long way toward making the 45 the dominant singles 
format for the next twenty years.”62 Within a few years, record players were 
equipped with variable speeds that allowed listeners to play all three formats (LPs, 
45s, and soon-to-be obsolete 78s) with relatively easy adjustments, and soon 
enough even Columbia—chuffed with the success of its Masterworks LP classical 
label—began releasing 45s (while still exploring putting pop music into the LP 
format).63 
And so the 1950s and 1960s became a tug of war—indeed, a “trade war”64—
between the three phonograph formats for the massive baby boomer listening 
base. While classical music dominated LP sales, popular music seemed more 
comfortable on 45s—despite RCA’s efforts to sell classical consumers on classical 
albums on 45s.65 Indeed, some listeners saw the LP as nothing more than a means 
of creating musical wallpaper, as Marmorstein notes that some “consumers 
equated active listening with record-changing.”66 The “War of the Speeds” 
resulted, according to David Morton, in a compromise: the LP would win the 
classical and “album” market, while the 45 would be used “almost exclusively for 
singles.”67 The casualty was the 78, which could not compete with the newer  
 
 
58. See generally id. 
59. DAVID MORTON, SOUND RECORDING: THE LIFE STORY OF A TECHNOLOGY 136 (2004). 
60. MARMORSTEIN, supra note 56, at 160. 
61. See id. at 170. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 172. 
64. Harold Faber, Trade War Traps Record Buyers; Three Devices Needed to Play All Types, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1949, at 1, 14. 
65. MORTON, supra note 59, at 139. 
66. MARMORSTEIN, supra note 56, at 173. 
67. MORTON, supra note 59, at 139. 
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market entrants.68 Ten years after its introduction, the LP accounted for “nearly 
60 percent of a record business . . . approaching the $400-millioin-a-year [sic] 
line.”69 
The question then became where would pop music fit in: the album or the 
single? Frank Sinatra is often credited for introducing the first “concept 
albums”—long-playing collections of songs sharing a theme or a mood—with 
Songs for Young Lovers! (a 10-inch LP in 1954) and In the Wee Small Hours of the 
Morning (a 12-inch, or “full sized,” LP in 1955).70 As rock and roll rose to pop 
music dominance during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the shift from the single 
song to the LP “album” (now a vestigial misnomer, because most releases since 
the 1960s have consisted of single discs rather than albums holding many records) 
as the primary vessel of musical listening seemed more and more pronounced. 
Bands like the Beach Boys and the Beatles were stretching the boundaries of pop 
and rock and roll to better occupy the bigger and richer canvas the LP presented. 
The recording industry, recording artists, and music consumers all drove the 
shift from a singles-driven pop music market to a market dominated by albums. 
The recording industry certainly had multiple incentives to accomplish this task. 
First and foremost, albums represented a more expensive product. At the peak of 
the Album Era in the early 1980s, full-length records cost $8.99,71 while a 45 RPM 
single only cost about $1.50.72 The added expenses of album production were 
offset by the efficiencies of recording and producing multiple songs instead of 
going into the studio one song at a time. These efficiencies were replicated on the 
distribution and retail end as well—selling a group of songs in a single, higher-
priced product was more efficient than trying to sell multiple singles at lower 
prices. Setting aside brief rises in singles sales that could be attributed to the brief 
popularity of disco (1976 to 1979) and a tiny bump in 1983 most likely attributable 
to the phenomenon surrounding Michael Jackson’s Thriller and its ten 
commercially available seven-inch singles,73 single sales dramatically declined with 
each passing year, from 222.8 million units in 1973, to under 50 million units by 
1989, to nearly nothing by the 1990s.74 The difference in sales is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
68. Id. at 140. 
69. Martin Mayer, Rocking the Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1958, § 11, at 2. 
70. See generally Frank Sinatra, ALLMUSIC, http://allmusic.com/artist/frank-sinatra-p3150 (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
71. STEVE KNOPPER, APPETITE FOR SELF-DESTRUCTION 31 (2009). 
72. E-mail Interview with Marc Weinstein, co-founder and co-owner, Amoeba Music (Sept. 
21, 2012) (on file with author). 
73. See listings of Michael Jackson’s 45 RPM singles at 45cat, Michael Jackson—Discography, 
45CAT, http://www.45cat.com/artist/michael-jackson/us (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
74. GEOFFREY HULL ET AL., THE MUSIC BUSINESS AND RECORDING INDUSTRY: 
DELIVERING MUSIC IN THE 21ST CENTURY 246 (3d ed. 2011). 
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Figure 1: Album vs. Single Sales (in millions of units), 1968–201075 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From the recording artist’s perspective, the format battle was over much 
earlier, in 1967. That year, the Beatles released Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band 
without accompanying singles.76 The band did not even promote the album by 
single directly; the Fab Four’s only single from the time of the album’s release 
featured two songs (“Penny Lane” and “Strawberry Fields Forever”) that were not 
on the album and would only later find homes on the later The Magical Mystery Tour 
album.77 And where went the Beatles, so went the industry: by the 1970s, singles 
became little more than a marketing tool—and not a recording artist’s focus—by 
which labels would promote their full-length records.78 Most songs were not 
available for single sales; listeners who wanted to acquire the album’s offerings on 
an à la carte basis were simply out of luck.79 The Album Era had well and truly 
begun. 
 
75. See R. SERGE DENISOFF, SOLID GOLD: THE POPULAR RECORD INDUSTRY 4 (1971); 
HULL, supra note 52, at 245; RIAA 2011 Year-End Shipment Statistics, RIAA, http://76.74.24.142/ 
FA8A2072-6BF8-D44D-B9C8-CE5F55BBC050.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) [hereinafter RIAA 
Year-End Statistics]; The History of Recording Industry Sales, 1973–2003, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Feb. 17, 
2011), http://digitalmusicnews.com/stories/021711disruption. 
76. See listings of The Beatles’ 45 RPM singles at 45cat, The Beatles—Discography, 45CAT, 
http://www.45cat.com/artist/the-beatles/us/2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
77. Jon Pareles, At Age 20, Sgt. Pepper Marches On, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1987, § 2, at 1. 
78. HULL, supra note 52, at 244 (“Until the recent resurgence of singles in the digital realm, the 
single was primarily a promotional tool—an expense.”). 
79. See John B. Horrigan, The Internet and Consumer Choice, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE 
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It is less clear whether consumer desire as manifested in rising album sales 
over single sales during this period was the tail wagging the dog—demanding 
longer, more expensive products from favorite recording artists—or merely 
accepting a shift in market conditions and buying what was available. The rise in 
the early 1970s in the popularity of “album oriented rock” radio stations, stations 
that focused on playing songs that were not released as singles,80 could be read as 
an indicator that songs not available as singles remained desirable to listeners. 
The introduction of the compact disc in the 1980s further reinforced this 
“album-as-product” reality. CDs offered consumers more of everything: listening 
times approaching eighty minutes, unsurpassed audio fidelity, a durable, difficult-
to-scratch surface, and the convenience of never having to rewind or fast forward 
between songs. Correspondingly, the recording industry saw “an opportunity to 
change consumers’ expectations about what music should cost.”81 Consumers 
soon spent upwards of $16 for an album that used to cost $9 on vinyl.82 The result 
was a music industry boom from 1984 to 2000, with CDs earning $17.2 million in 
1983, then a 500-plus percent leap the following year to $103.3 million, to $12.8 
billion at its peak in 1999.83 Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that sales of 
singles—on CDs or cassette single (the “cassingle”)—never reached the success or 
market share once enjoyed by vinyl singles. Since the costs of producing cassette 
and CD singles “rivaled that of manufacturing costs for an entire album,”84 the 
conventional single—that is, a single musical work embodied in a physical 
object—was effectively dead by 2000.85 
B. The Music Industry, 2000–2012 
Until the Internet came. Although the introduction of the MP3 file format 
for reproducing music digitally in 1991 was a muted affair, advances in Internet 
connectivity over the following decade resulted in a digital music explosion. It 
began in 1997, when WinAmp,a free program for playing MP3s, became widely 
available and the MP3.com website launched as a “hub for finding free music on 
the web.”86 Free music became even more popular with the ascendance of 
Napster, the music file-sharing site that launched in 1999 and garnered nearly 20 
 
PROJECT 13 (May 18, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2008/PIP 
_Consumer.Decisions.pdf.pdf (“[A]fter the demise of the single 45rpm record (in which the consumer 
still paid for the obscure B-side), [consumers] had to buy a collection of songs.”). 
80. Album Oriented Rock, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Album-oriented_rock (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
81. KNOPPER, supra note 71, at 32. 
82. Id. at 31. 
83. Id. at 34–35. 
84. HULL, supra note 52, at 246. 
85. See id. (“Singles accounted for less than 1 percent of unit volume and less than 0.5 percent 
of sales dollars in 2002.”). 
86. KNOPPER, supra note 71, at 118–19. 
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million users by July 2000.87 The site seemed to offer users the long-awaited 
“celestial jukebox”: on-demand access to almost any song or album. The 
recording industry’s legal efforts to prevent peer-to-peer file sharing resulted in the 
rapid demise of the service, but left a gaping chasm in the marketplace for pop 
music: where would an online-savvy public gets its music? And how would the 
public get it quickly, easily, legally, and—for the recording industry—profitably? 
The answer was iTunes. Steve Jobs introduced the iPod in 2001, and the 
iTunes Store launched in 2003, offering a catalog of 200,000 songs for ninety-nine 
cents each.88 The singles market was effectively reborn overnight with the launch 
of the iTunes Store: digital single sales launched in 2003 with 139.4 million sales—
a greater number of single sales than any year since the post-Thriller 1983 bump—
and rose dramatically each year thereafter, as evident in Figure 1, above.89 By 2007, 
digital singles sold more than 844 million units,90 compared to 584.9 million 
albums downloaded digitally or sold as CDs.91 
With the resurgence of the single came a panic in the recording industry. As 
one industry executive noted, “[T]he problem is [people in the music business are] 
selling songs and not albums . . . . [D]o the math.”92 Steve Knopper summarizes: 
  Sales of iTunes singles surged, while old-fashioned album sales—and 
major label revenues—dropped. While CD sales continue to make up the 
bulk of the major labels’ profits, iTunes shifted the balance dramatically 
and quickly. Although this shift is great for consumers, it’s a negative for 
record companies: At least for now, digital music just isn’t as 
profitable . . . .93 
Profits aside, the contemporary economic landscape for the music industry is 
indisputably dominated by the now-digital single: digital singles sold over a billion 
units in 2009, compared to 385 million CD shipments, and 76 million digital 
album sales.94 The recording industry and artists alike have shifted their attention 
in response, and modern artist success is defined by single sales, not album sales.95 
Equally important is the renewed availability of the single. Though it may 
have been nearly impossible to purchase a single song by any popular artist just a 
decade ago, today nearly any song by any artist can be acquired easily and instantly 
with just a few clicks of a mouse. Thus, the catalogs of artists that were once only 
 
87. Id. at 135. 
88. Id. at 177. 
89. HULL, supra note 52, at 246. 
90. KNOPPER, supra note 71, at 181. 
91. HULL, supra note 52, at 245. 
92. Id. 
93. KNOPPER, supra note 71, at 181. 
94. Perritt, supra note 5, at 835. 
95. See John Seabrook, The Song Machine, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 2012, at 50. Note that 
Seabrook draws a line between “the rock era” defined by album sales and a resurgent “pop era” 
defined by singles sales. I disagree with this distinction. See infra Part III.A.3. 
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acquirable by purchase of physical albums—including the individual tracks from 
Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band—are now easily attainable on an à la carte 
basis.96 
III. ARGUMENT 
In light of the history of the music and recording industry discussed above, it 
seems clear that recording industry practices in the late twentieth century raised 
compelling questions of antitrust jurisprudence. Did the shift from the single to 
the album as the dominant unit of popular musical measurement violate the 
Paramount Court’s holding that “a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless 
another copyright is accepted [is illegal]”?97 Moreover, did the shift to albums 
result in conventional tying? However, before addressing whether the practices 
were unlawful, it is necessary to address the threshold inquiry of whether the 
single song or the album is the relevant product for tying analysis. Under the 
Paramount test for tying, if the album is its own unique product apart from a single, 
singles within it are not tied in a manner that violates antitrust law. 
A. Which is the Relevant Product for Antitrust Analysis—the Single or the Album? 
The threshold inquiry asks which is the appropriate product for antitrust 
analysis, the single song or the long-playing album. As discussed above, the first 
element of the test for tying requires that there be two separate products to 
establish the conditioned or coercive relationship between them. 
1. Why the Single? 
History, statutes, and the present market all support the conclusion that the 
single is the appropriate unit of measurement for pop music. Over the last sixty 
years, the pendulum has swung back and forth between the single song and the 
album as the dominant measure of pop music consumption.98 It is necessary to 
determine whether, from an antitrust perspective, the song remained the 
appropriate unit of measurement, even during the Album Era, when album sales 
were at their peak. This Note proceeds first by examining of the Copyright Act, 
then the recording industry’s own practices, and finally the sudden shift in 
consumer behavior when singles once again became available. 
The Copyright Act itself may be read as support for finding the song to be 
the relevant product. The Act grants exclusive rights to owners of musical works, 
including the rights of reproduction, distribution, performance, and display.99 The 
 
96. See MP3 Downloads: Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, AMAZON, http://www 
.amazon.com (product search MP3 Music for Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band) (last visited 
Oct. 26, 2012). 
97. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948). 
98. See discussion supra Part II. 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
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Act does not explicitly define the scope of musical works—that is, whether a 
musical work is a song or a collection of songs.100 However, individual songs are 
indisputably protected as musical works by copyright, regardless of the copyright 
status of the recording or compilation in which they are presented.101 Albums are 
often registered with the U.S. Copyright Office as compilations of musical 
works;102 copyright protection in compilations extends only to the selection and 
arrangement of the works comprising the whole.103 So viewed, an inference can be 
drawn that the compilations and sound recordings are simply the conduits by 
which the songs reach the market, but that it is the songs—representing original 
works of authorship—that are closer to the core of copyright protection, and thus 
are the more essential products. The Second Circuit recently endorsed this view in 
Bryant v. Media Right Productions, Inc.,104 noting that, because an “album is a 
collection of preexisting materials—songs—that are selected and arranged by the 
author in a way that results in an original work of authorship—the album,”105 the 
“album falls within the Act’s expansive definition of compilation.”106 
Although recording industry practices are ever shifting, the single song has 
always been central to the music marketplace, even when bundled with other 
songs in album form. As discussed above, even during the years during which 
singles were difficult to obtain by listener-consumers, labels used singles as 
promotional tools. In other words, it was the song that sold the album, not the 
album that sold the song. The industry practices directed to other consumers—
such as licensees like the radio stations using a blanket license discussed in BMI—
also support a song-centric view of the musical marketplace. Although the blanket 
license permits access to a deep well of works, it is applied song-by-song, and does 
not require that a bundle of songs be played together. At the time that a license is 
 
100. See id. § 101, where the list of the Act’s defined terms does not include “musical works.” 
101. See, for example, the district court’s discussion in King Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F. Supp. 
2d 812, 841 (M.D. Tenn. 2006). 
102. See, e.g., Blood on the Tracks / [Words and Music by] Bob Dylan, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 
http://cocatalog.loc.gov (basic search for registration number “TX0001298888”) (last visited Oct. 26, 
2012). The songs comprising the album are separately registered as musical works. See, e.g., Idiot  
Wind, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://cocatalog.loc.gov (basic search for registration number 
“RE0000862514”) (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
103. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991); see also 1-3 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (noting that Feist applies to all compilations, not just factual 
compilations). 
104. Bryant v. Media Right Prods, Inc., 603 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 656 
(2010). 
105. Id. at 140–41; see also Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, No. 06 CV 5936 KMW, 
2011 WL 1311771, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011) (holding “[n]othing in the Copyright Act bars a 
plaintiff from recovering a statutory damage award for a sound recording issued as an individual 
track. . . .”). 
106. Bryant, 603 F.3d at 140. Also relevant as an example are the reflections by members of 
Fleetwood Mac that a number of the songs on Rumours, an album justly celebrated for its 
cohesiveness, were holdovers from earlier creative periods and personnel configurations. CLASSIC 
ALBUMS: FLEETWOOD MAC: RUMOURS (Rhino Home Video 1998). 
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granted, it provides access to any song under the license, and there is no 
requirement to license multiple works by a single artist, or indeed multiple works 
at all. These practices indicate that that the song rather than the album is the 
appropriate unit for legal analysis. 
Consumer behavior is perhaps the strongest indicator that the song rather 
than the album is the relevant product. As discussed below in Part II.B, in the 
post-digital marketplace, single song sales dominate both CD album and digital 
album sales by orders of magnitude (billions to millions). In 2010, the Recording 
Industry Association of America reported that 1.28 billion single songs were 
downloaded, compared to 85.8 million downloaded albums that same year.107 
While it is certainly possible that consumer tastes shifted suddenly upon the 
opening of the iTunes music store from an album-oriented mindset to one 
preferring singles, it seems more likely that the shift represents a popular 
declaration of preference: if given the option, listeners prefer to pick and choose 
their music by the song.108 
2. Why the Album? 
Nevertheless, there is considerable support for the view that the album, at 
least for a time, supplanted the song as the relevant product and the appropriate 
unit of musical measurement. For artistic, economic, and some consumer-driven 
reasons, pop music—especially during the “rock era” of the mid-1960s through 
the end of the twentieth century—may have been better served by the long-
playing format, and defenders could argue that the end result was the defining 
product of the musical marketplace. 
There is general consensus among music fans that the expansion of the 
musical artist’s tableau to album-length recordings enriched the medium. The 
Beach Boys’ 1966 Pet Sounds is credited as one of the great leaps forward in pop 
and rock music, heralding both the dawn of the psychedelic era in pop music and 
a deeper commitment to exploring the capabilities of ever-advancing recording 
techniques.109 Paul McCartney credited the album as a defining influence on Sgt. 
Pepper’s,110 which—as discussed above—then influenced the entire industry. After 
the releases of Pet Sounds and its British counterpoint Sgt. Pepper’s, pop and rock 
music grew more grandiose in its ambitions, as reflected in the success of concept 
albums (such as the Who’s Tommy and Pink Floyd’s The Dark Side of the Moon), 
 
107. RIAA Year-End Statistics, supra note 75, at 1. 
108. See Perritt, supra note 5, at 835 (concluding that it is plausible that “consumers who are 
free to buy only what they want would choose to buy only about a third of what is available on 
albums”). 
109. See, e.g., David M. Beard, True 5-Star Albums: The Beach Boys’ “Pet Sounds,” GOLDMINE 
(Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.goldminemag.com/article/true-5-star-albums-the-beach-boys-pet-
sounds. 
110. Jack Doyle, “Early Beach Boys”: 1962-1966, POPHISTORYDIG ( June 14, 2010), http://www 
.pophistorydig.com/?tag=pet-sounds-sgt-peppers. 
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double-length studio albums (such as the Beatles’ White Album and Pink Floyd’s 
The Wall), and double-length live concert albums (such as Cheap Trick’s Live at 
Budokan and Peter Frampton’s Frampton Comes Alive!). 
From artistic, production, marketing, and distribution standpoints, the album 
brought with it numerous efficiencies, some of which shaped consumer response. 
Although consumers also benefited from efficiencies in collecting songs more 
easily in album format, it is better to include the consumer efficiencies in an 
overall analysis of legitimate business justifications, because tying is a section 1 
violation that makes the end consumer a party to the unlawful conduct. 
Considerable efficiencies on the supply side (manufacturing, distributing, and 
retail) and on the consumer side could combine to make a collection of songs a 
more appealing proposition than having to collect those songs one by one—
especially during a pre-digital age when the physical objects embodying the songs 
were bulky and competed with other purchases for physical space.111 
3. Conclusion 
The question of whether it is the song or the album that is the appropriate 
unit of musical measurement does not yield a clear-cut answer. While it seems that 
many albums are mere compilations of single songs, for a time at least some artists 
treated some albums as distinct art forms, expanding the artistic reach of 
composers and recording artists beyond single songs into more complex and 
rewarding works—if not for consumers, certainly for producers. Arguably, a 
dotted line could be drawn distinguishing rock albums from pop songs as the 
relevant product.112 But this distinction between pop music and rock music would 
be nearly impossible to apply: were the Beatles a pop band that made rock music, 
or vice versa?113 Further, for every Dark Side of the Moon (and its thousands of 
weeks of residency on various Billboard charts since its 1973 release),114 there is a 
collection of singles with enduring popularity and massive commercial appeal, like 
Eagles: Their Greatest Hits 1971–1976, which remains tied with Thriller for the 
greatest selling album of all time.115 Indeed, even Pink Floyd, a band closely 
associated with album-length opuses, has released no fewer than three “best of” 
 
111. See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 5, at 29–30 (discussing enhanced production and 
distribution efficiencies in the post-digital era). 
112. See Seabrook, supra note 95. 
113. A district court also came to this conclusion when contemplating the creation of genre-
specific mini-blanket licenses, and found that “it is simply not feasible to categorize music for 
licensing purposes into such performance style labels.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. 
Supp. 758, 768 (D. Del. 1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). 
114. See Dark Side of the Moon, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Dark_Side_of 
_the_Moon (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
115. Top 100 Albums, RIAA, http://riaa.com/goldandplatinum.php?content_selector=top-
100-albums (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). Note that three of the seven top-selling albums of all time are 
collections of previously released songs: either greatest-hits or live-concert albums. 
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compilations presenting popular songs divorced from their album-length 
conceptual settings.116 While this could be mere commercialism from the label’s 
front offices and not reflective of the band’s intent, such releases nonetheless cut 
against the argument that the album—and not the song—is what matters most to 
listeners. 
After weighing various factors, including LP-innovator Columbia’s original 
intention that the long-playing album was for classical and not popular songs, and 
the unmistakable consumer preference for single songs evident after the launch of 
the iTunes Store and renewed access to singles, it is fair to conclude that it is the 
song, and not the album, at the root of popular and even rock music. 
B. Did Recording Industry Practices Violate Antitrust Laws? 
Assuming that the song is the appropriate unit of analysis, did the recording 
industry’s practices violate antitrust law? Although this inquiry is driven by the 
Court’s Paramount and Loew’s block-booking holdings, it is also necessary to 
determine whether the recording industry’s practices ran afoul of antitrust law’s 
more conventional tying doctrines. 
As discussed in Part I, the modern test for tying as enunciated in Jefferson 
Parish requires determining (1) whether there are in fact two separate products in 
separate markets being tied, (2) whether there is coercion or conditioning 
compelling a consumer’s decision to purchase the tied products, (3) whether the 
defendant has sufficient market power in the tying product market, and (4) 
whether there is a not-insubstantial dollar volume in the tied product market 
affected by the arrangement that affects interstate commerce.117 
1. Is the Album a Product Apart from the Song? 
As argued above, the song and not the album is the relevant product in 
antitrust analysis. From that standpoint, it seems almost tautological to assert that 
because the song is the relevant product, each song is itself a separate product. 
Nevertheless, this view is reasonable as applied to the Album Era because, prior to 
2006’s Illinois Tool Works decision, a copyrighted work “by reason of its copyright” 
enjoyed a “‘monopolistic’ position” creating a presumption of market power as a 
tying product.118 However, this presumption of market power due to the 
copyright is at odds with Jefferson Parish, which stated that “whether one or two 
products are involved turns . . . on the character of the demand for the two items . . . . 
[A] tying arrangement cannot exist unless two separate product markets have been 
 
116. Pink Floyd: Discography (Compilations), ALLMUSIC, http://allmusic.com/artist/pink-floyd-
p76669/discography/compilations (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
117. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 8 (1984), abrogated by Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
118. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. 
at 34. 
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linked.”119 In Jefferson Parish, the Court noted that “no tying arrangement can exist 
unless there is a sufficient demand for the purchase of anesthesiological services 
separate from hospital services to identify a distinct product market in which it is 
efficient to offer anesthesiological services separately from hospital services.”120 
The “character of the demand” required by the Court to establish separate 
products in Jefferson Parish can be analyzed in terms of the relative popularity of the 
songs themselves. For this inquiry, the marketplace itself—namely, the iTunes 
Store121—provides a window into consumer decisions. As in the example of Sgt. 
Pepper’s, consumers have downloaded individual Beatles songs at a rate of nearly 
five-to-one over digital albums. From this baseline demand for single songs, a 
glimpse at the Sgt. Pepper’s iTunes Store page (Illustration 1) reveals a wide 
disparity in the popularity of individual songs, favoring some (“Lucy in the Sky 
with Diamonds,” “When I’m Sixty-Four”) far above others (“Within You Without 
You”), while favoring some (“Fixing a Hole”) hardly at all. 
 
Illustration 1: iTunes Store Popularity Rankings for Songs Sold  
from Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band Album122 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19–21 (emphasis added). 
120. Id. at 21–22. 
121. While I use the iTunes Store in this Note, the iTunes Store is not the only vendor in the 
market; Amazon is one competitor, among many others. 
122. Screenshot from the iTunes Store for The Beatles, Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band, 
taken Apr. 7, 2012. 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
1068 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1047 
 
This lack of uniformity of demand, especially when considering the songs on 
a popular album by a band as popular as the Beatles, underscores that each song is 
a product competing with others songs on the same album. 
The separate demand requirement can also be satisfied through an 
examination of the choices implicated by a consumer’s musical listening habits. 
Current audio devices like CD players (especially the multidisc CD changer) and 
MP3 players permit—and arguably have conditioned—the listener to self-curate 
the order and origin of musical selections. As discussed above in Part II.A, this 
was also the norm for popular music in the years before the prevalence of the 
long-playing album. While listeners are technically free to self-curate their long-
playing albums, the recording industry’s practices during the Album Era set a 
default rule that effectively eliminated the competition for the next song, a market 
that is preserved by the à la carte musical options provided by singles. In other 
words, while singles preserve the listener’s right to determine which song should 
be played next, the album—be it in LP form, or on cassette or CD—obstructs this 
opportunity to self-curate. That the innovations in consumer audio devices have 
enhanced listeners’ abilities to self-curate song selection (as evidenced by popular 
acceptance of the “playlist” of listener-selected songs) further supports a finding 
that each song is a separate product subject to separate demand, capable of 
fulfilling a listener-consumer’s selection in the “next song market” re-enabled by 
digital technologies. 
2. Is There Coercion or a Conditioned Sale? 
The question then became whether the sale of the tying product to the tied 
product was coerced or conditioned. In Jefferson Parish, the Court stated that “[i]f 
each of the products may be purchased separately in a competitive market, one 
seller’s decision to sell the two in a single package imposes no unreasonable 
restraint on either market . . . .”123 But as discussed above in Part II, the availability 
of singles (on 45, cassette, or CD) declined dramatically from 1973 until the 
launch of the iTunes Store in 2003, to the point where they were almost 
completely unavailable for most of the 1980s and 1990s. Thus, in many cases (for 
example, Sgt. Pepper’s), there was no way of purchasing a desired song (for 
example, “A Day in the Life,” “When I’m Sixty-Four”) without purchasing at least 
one—and often many—less desired or undesired songs (for example, “Within 
You Without You,” “Being for the Benefit of Mr. Kite”).124 Where once studios 
conditioned exhibitors into block booking their copyrighted films, here too the 
labels effectively forced block sales of copyrighted songs. Consequently, at least 
 
123. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11–12. 
124. Although this Note relies on Sgt. Pepper’s for this analysis, perhaps The Beatles (popularly 
known as The White Album) would be a stronger example: it is a two-album, thirty-song behemoth also 
marketed without singles. To enjoy popular favorites like “Back in the U.S.S.R.,” one also had to 
purchase “Honey Pie” or the much-debated “Revolution 9.” 
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for songs that were only available as part of an album—which, as discussed above, 
represented an increasing percentage of the overall pop music market between 
1973 and 2003—there was a coerced or conditioned sale of other songs. To the 
extent technology made self-curation of songs more difficult or impossible by 
tying the second next song market, there was an interference with that market. 
3. Is there Market Power in the Tying Product Market? 
The bold presumption of market power in copyrighted works established in 
Loew’s is predicated both on uniqueness—an empirically objective condition—and 
on customer appeal—a subjective one. The Loew’s holding thus presumes market 
power in every copyrighted sound recording ever released. As discussed in Part I, 
Illinois Tool Works effectively destroyed this presumption. For the purposes of this 
Note, however, the Illinois Tool Works holding is of limited impact for two reasons. 
First, it is important to note that the Illinois Tool Works decision came down 
in 2006, three years after the launch of the iTunes Store, and mere months before 
the Amazon MP3 store launched in 2007.125 Thus, by the time the Supreme Court 
abrogated the presumption of market power in copyrighted works, the market had 
already evolved to the point where widespread single digital-song download 
purchases effectively nullified the label-imposed tying conditions. After Illinois Tool 
Works, consumers had the option of purchasing a growing catalog of songs on an 
à la carte basis.126 
Even beyond the obsolescence of the Illinois Tool Works holding as applied to 
the relevant period, the Album Era tying case law regarding “unique” products 
may support a finding of market power in the tying product market—that is, the 
market for the desired single song. As stated in Loew’s, “each film . . . ‘was . . . a 
unique product,’”127 and “economic power may be inferred from uniqueness”128 
in tandem with its copyright.129 The Court attempted to cabin the broad-brush 
Loew’s presumption for years before dealing it a coup de grace in Illinois Tool 
Works, notably in the Fortner cases. At issue there was whether a financing 
arrangement was tied to the purchase of overpriced prefabricated steel homes.130 
In Fortner I, the Court stated in a footnote that “[u]niqueness confers economic 
power only when other competitors are in some way prevented from offering the 
 
125. Amazon.com Launches Public Beta of Amazon MP3, a Digital Music Store Offering Customers 
Earth’s Biggest Selection of a la Carte DRM-Free MP3 Music Downloads (press release), BUSINESSWIRE, 
(Sept. 26. 2007), http://www.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news 
_view&newsId=20070925005710. 
126. See discussion supra Part II. 
127. United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962), abrogated by Ill. Tool Works v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
128. Id. at 45. 
129. Id. at 48. 
130. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc. (Fortner I), 394 U.S. 495, 497 (1969); Fortner II, 
429 U.S. at 610 (1977). 
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distinctive product themselves,”131 concluded that the financing arrangements 
were sufficiently unique to potentially support a finding of market power, and 
allowed the case to proceed.132 
A decade later, the Fortner II Court backtracked and found that while 
“copyright monopolies in [Paramount] . . . represented tying products that the 
Court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption of economic 
power,”133 the financing arrangements at issue lacked such uniqueness.134 Seven 
years later, the Jefferson Parish Court tried to further limit the reach of Loew’s by 
ignoring it—noting that no “presumption of market power find[s] support in our 
prior cases”—and distinguishing Paramount and Loew’s by their foundation in 
patent misuse doctrines instead of conventional tying.135 The Jefferson Parish Court 
limited the holdings in Paramount and Loew’s, acknowledging that uniqueness 
accorded a presumption of power, but only “when the seller offers a unique 
product that competitors are not able to offer.”136 One district court interpreted 
the Fortner and Jefferson Parish holdings to mean that establishing market power 
based on uniqueness of a good means establishing that no “competitors could have 
produced products which would perform the functions performed by defendants’ 
products, because defendants possessed some advantage not shared by their 
competitors.”137 
Even as the Court shifted its jurisprudence, it appears that songs—and here 
particularly, sound recordings—could reasonably be found to enjoy market power 
largely as a function of their status as unique works. First, songs reflect the same 
sort of creativity the Fortner II Court (as well as the Loew’s Court) seemed to 
recognize as being categorically unique.138 More importantly, it can be argued that 
songs are unique because copyright theoretically ensures that competitors cannot 
lawfully offer the same product, which is consonant with the more restrictive view 
of uniqueness advanced in Jefferson Parish.139 
Thus, during the years under present analysis, and indeed until the Illinois Tool 
Works Court destroyed any presumption of market power based on the 
uniqueness of a tying good,140 sound recordings of songs could be deemed unique, 
which—in addition to their similarity to the creative works at issue in Paramount 
 
131. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 505 n.2. 
132. Id. at 510. 
133. Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 619. 
134. Id. at 622. 
135. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984), abrogated by Ill. 
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink., Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 34 (2006). 
136. Id. at 17. 
137. 3 P.M., Inc. v. Basic Four Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1350, 1358 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 
138. See Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 619. 
139. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 17. 
140. See, e.g., Tele Atlas N.V. v. NAVTEQ Corp., No. C-05-01673 RMW, 2008 WL 4809441, 
at *14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) (holding impermissible a presumption of market power based on IP 
rights post-Illinois Tool Works). 
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and Loew’s and the Loew’s presumption of market power for copyrighted works—
provides a reasonable basis for finding that such works enjoyed market power. 
4. Is There a Not-Insubstantial Dollar Amount in the Tied Market? 
A finding of unlawful tying also requires that a not-insubstantial dollar 
volume of the tied product market be affected in order to establish an effect on 
interstate commerce.141 Here, one need only consider the dollar amounts at stake 
to find that the industry practices meet the Court’s standards. Under the “next 
song market” analysis discussed in Part III.B.1, any single song could satisfy the 
demand of that market, depending on taste—that is, the tied market. In 2010, the 
recording industry brought in $1.3 billion in single song downloads, a twelve 
percent increase over the year before.142 And the recording industry had been a 
billion dollar business since 1967 for the combined singles and album market.143 
Thus, pop music has long been big business, and abundant evidence exists to 
support a finding that the tied market involves a substantial dollar volume. These 
figures support a finding that the dollar amount in the tied market is “enough . . . 
so as not to be merely de minimis,” the threshold established by the Supreme 
Court.144 
Thus, there is a colorable argument that the recording industry’s shift from 
the single to the album resulted in widespread tying in violation of the antitrust 
laws. 
5. Is There a Legitimate Business Justification? 
The tying analysis then turns to whether the efficiencies and benefits of the 
tying arrangement are legitimate business justifications that outweigh the risks to 
competition.145 As discussed above in Parts II and III.A.2, the recording industry 
could point to numerous efficiencies in production, manufacturing, distribution, 
and retail that could cut against condemnation—per se or otherwise—of the tying 
arrangements constructed by the shift to albums. Certainly, during the period 
central to this Note’s analysis (1973 through 2003), the fact that music commerce 
was still rooted in physical objects (records, cassettes, and CDs) as opposed to 
downloadable digital files made such efficiencies more of a concern than they are 
today. Now, the digital marketplace has reduced or eliminated many of the 
 
141. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 16. 
142. RIAA Year-End Statistics, supra note 75, at 1. 
143. DENISOFF, supra note 75, at 5. 
144. Fortner II , 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969). 
145. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1349 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“A tie-in does not violate the antitrust laws ‘if implemented for a legitimate purpose and if no 
less restrictive alternative is available.’”) (citation omitted). 
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distribution costs that were once driving forces of the consolidation of the 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s.146 
Furthermore, the same economic considerations that were at the core of the 
movie studios’ block-booking practices could be inferred from the recording 
industry’s shift to the album. The price discrimination hypothesis maps cleanly 
onto the long-playing album context: the labels could earn more for an album 
comprising a group of songs with varying values to consumers at a single block 
price than they could selling one song at a time at a fixed price.147 
Are these justifications sufficient to trump application of the antitrust laws? 
If the Court’s Paramount decision provides any indication, they are not. There, the 
defendants asserted that the very future of their operations depended in large part 
on their ability to block book films. 
An unsympathetic Court denied that such dire efficiencies were cause to 
avoid antitrust liability, stating that 
enforcement of the restriction as to block-booking will be very 
disadvantageous to it and will greatly impair its ability to operate 
profitably. But the policy of the anti-trust laws is not qualified or 
conditioned by the convenience of those whose conduct is regulated. 
Nor can a vested interest, in a practice which contravenes the policy of 
the anti-trust laws, receive judicial sanction.148 
Thus, even with the potential health of a massive industry in the balance of 
efficiency, the Paramount Court did not look kindly on efficiency as a legitimate 
business justification. And so, even with the economic fate of the recording 
industry hanging in the balance, the justifications seem unlikely to sway a court 
that has found anticompetitive conduct—particularly if the Court actually decides 
to apply the harsh and unforgiving per se analysis. 
It remains necessary to consider whether legitimate business justifications 
supported recording industry practices.149 Consumer preference may provide a 
legitimate business justification for the shift away from singles to the album 
format. In essence, the labels could argue that albums give consumers more of 
what they want for less money on a per-unit basis.150 In In re Data General Corp. 
 
146. See HULL, supra note 52, at 31; see also Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 5, at 27-30 
(discussing the history of singles and albums). 
147. See generally Stigler, supra note 33 (discussing price discrimination theory). 
148. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948). 
149. See Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1212 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(“When a legitimate business justification supports a monopolist's exclusionary conduct, that conduct 
does not violate § 2 of the Sherman Act.”). 
150. Assuming an average of twelve songs, the per-song cost of an $8.99 album was 
approximately seventy-five cents; singles cost $1.50. See discussion supra Part II. I acknowledge the 
possibility that an entire album of songs could be assembled from singles for the same price as an 
album, but this ignores the realities that B-sides often provided alternate versions or non-album 
tracks, thereby rendering the task almost impossible. 
 Although not explored in this Note, the more-for-less argument could also open a door to 
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Antitrust Litigation,151 defendant Data General attempted to justify its tying of its 
operating software to computer hardware by asserting that customers preferred 
the “single vendor accountability” the tie offered.152 The trial court rejected this 
proffered justification, concluding that Data General could achieve this goal using 
less restrictive means.153 Similarly, a decade later in United States v. Microsoft,154 the 
D.C. Circuit remanded the question of Microsoft’s proffered consumer-demand 
justification that users preferred web browsers to be bundled with operating 
systems, and set as the default, finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to the 
opportunity to rebut Microsoft’s claim that the consumer demands offset the 
harms to competition created by the tie.155 
The same concerns that made the courts skeptical of the consumer demand 
arguments in Data General and Microsoft are relevant in this analysis. As in Data 
General, the question becomes whether the recording labels’ gradual abandonment 
of the single song as a consumer product ignored less restrictive means of 
addressing marketplace demand. It would be impractical at best to release every 
single song of every single pop artist available on albums as singles, whether on a 
45 or as a CD single. The increased costs and physical needs demanded from 
production through distribution and retail render such an arrangement impossible. 
But impossibility at the extremes does not render impracticable more balanced 
solutions than simply eliminating singles from commerce. For example, labels 
could have been subject to a “popularity threshold,” by which any songs “hitting,” 
as determined by an algorithm of the song’s airplay, licensing, and tied album 
sales, must be released as singles.156 As Data General informs, a seller “need not pit 
the dictates of the marketplace against the mandate of the antitrust laws.”157 
Thus, in light of the costs to consumers (both added expenses of paying for 
unwanted tied music, and the “next song markets” made more inaccessible by 
album tie-ins), the labels’ proffered justifications would seem unpersuasive in light 
of the Jefferson Parish jurisprudence, which skeptically regards any harm to 
competition under the shibboleths of efficiency or market preference. 
 
antitrust condemnation on bundling theories, upon which a violation could be found if the 
“unbundled price [of the bundled goods] exceeds the but-for price for the product over which the 
firm has market power.” Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 403 (2009); see also generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Discounts and 
Exclusion, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 841 (2006) (discussing discounting and antitrust). 
151. In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
152. Id. at 1122. 
153. Id. at 1123. 
154. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
155. Id. at 96. 
156. I am exceptionally grateful to Professor Christopher R. Leslie for this idea. 
157. Data Gen., 490 F. Supp. at 1123. 
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6. Conclusion 
Under the test for conventional tying, there is a colorable argument for 
finding antitrust liability. By using the long-playing album format, the recording 
industry ties separate products in separate markets, conditions or coerces the sale 
of the tying product to the tied product, enjoys market power in the tying product, 
and involves a not-insubstantial dollar amount in the tied market, thereby affecting 
interstate commerce. 
This conclusion is strengthened by the presumptions of market power 
provided by the block-booking cases (until the 2006 Illinois Tool Works decision 
essentially did away with them). As discussed in Part I above, the Paramount Court 
affirmed the district court’s enjoinment of the “defendants from performing or 
entering into any license in which the right to exhibit one feature is conditioned 
upon the licensee’s taking one or more other features.”158 Notably, the Court 
appeared to leave the door open for condemnation of block booking outside of 
the motion picture context with its statement that “[a]ll [it] hold[s] to be illegal is a 
refusal to license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted.”159 
In sum, the antitrust implications for a recording industry dependent on the album 
as the primary product would seem dire, as all that was required to violate the law 
was the sale of two or more copyrighted works together where they were not 
available separately. 
Thus, analysis results in the conclusion that the sale of albums—at least 
those featuring songs not available separately for single purchase—violates the 
Court’s doctrines proscribing tying. 
C. Is BMI a Shield Against Tying Claims? 
Finally, it is necessary to assess whether the Court’s decision in BMI 
established a defense to tying and/or block-booking claims against the recording 
industry during the Album Era of 1973–2003. As discussed in Part I above, BMI 
held that the blanket licenses offered by ASCAP and BMI did not constitute 
unlawful tying arrangements because would-be licensees were still free to negotiate 
one-off licenses with artists directly.160 The Court also found that BMI and 
ASCAP were not liable for price fixing because the blanket license represented a 
new product that is “greater than the sum of its parts.”161 
Applied here, there are strong arguments in favor of finding that albums are 
indeed “new products” greater than the sum of their parts. As discussed above, 
the long-playing album offered recording artists a more expansive canvas than the 
three-and-a-half minutes to which pop music had been limited on 78s and even on 
 
158. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948). 
159. Id. at 159. 
160. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 6 (1979). 
161. Id. at 21–22. 
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45 singles. This in turn led to the development of more ambitious sonic 
endeavors, culminating in conceptually unified album-length works like Pet Sounds, 
Sgt. Pepper’s, or The Dark Side of the Moon. It could be argued that not every album 
was—and indeed, most albums were not—as cohesive or unified a work as those 
albums, which continue to represent the frontiers of popular music. Nonetheless, 
the “new product” argument is undoubtedly the most germane and potent 
rebuttal to attempts to impugn recording industry practices with antitrust 
concerns, especially in light of the albums like those named above that were 
produced with clear creative intent to present songs as part of a unified whole. 
However, this defense is not impervious to antitrust challenge. It is 
important to recall that the BMI Court primarily treated that case as a price fixing 
and not a tying case. Critical to the decision was the fact that there was no tying 
because individual performance licenses remained available outside of the blanket 
license; the Court stresses this by stating that “CBS . . . had a real choice” in the 
means of securing its licenses.162 Absent concern about unlawful tying, the Court 
was free to find room for the creation and pricing of new products like the blanket 
license. 
But in the context of long-playing albums, circumstances are different: as 
discussed in Part II, many—and by the 1980s, most—songs were only available on 
albums collecting multiple copyrighted works. This in essence deprived consumers 
of the “real choice” fundamental to the BMI Court’s reasoning in allowing the 
blanket license. Without that real choice, the BMI Court’s acceptance of the 
blanket license seems to be of limited application here. The later decisions testing 
this theory, particularly in the Chicago hymnal cases discussed above, have not 
closed the door on a lack of real choice being fatal to tying arrangements involving 
copyrighted works. 
CONCLUSION 
Although there is no denying that the Paramount and Loew’s decisions were 
purposed towards the practices of the film industry, the broadly worded holdings 
with respect to the sale or license of copyrighted works in those holdings support 
attempts at applying them in other contexts. Application of the block-booking and 
 
162. Id. at 24. But see Broad. Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 769 (D. Del. 
1981), aff’d, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). There, the district court allowed the blanket license for 
independent licensees like bar and restaurant owners, rejecting the antitrust counterclaimant’s 
proposed alternatives as unviable, and distinguished the blanket license at issue from the block-
booking cases by noting that “in those markets buyers could identify in advance the specific 
‘blockbuster’ films or compositions desired. Thus, ‘untying’ the package was much more feasible in 
those cases than here.” Id. at 765 n.9. The court’s logic was questionable, as the would-be licensees 
select songs they seek to license based on the specific desirability of those known songs, whereas the 
block-booked films were “blind licensed.” See Paramount, 334 U.S. at 157 n.11. In the end, the Moor-
Law court relied heavily on BMI and found that the blanket license was a new product and thus not 
subject to tying. Moor-Law, 527 F. Supp. at 769. 
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tying doctrines to the practices of the recording industry during the Album Era of 
1973–2003 results in two primary observations. 
First, by placing no boundaries on its block-booking holding in Paramount—
later buttressed by the presumption of market power accorded to copyrighted 
works in Loew’s—the Court laid a trap for the format of music that dominated 
popular culture for the next fifty years: the long-playing record. The Paramount and 
Loew’s holdings support a finding of market power to enforce a tying arrangement 
in songs as unique, creative, and copyrighted works. As such, “album-only tracks” 
not available for single consumption could be found to be per se violations of the 
antitrust laws, a conclusion supported by a more far-reaching analysis under the 
rule of reason. But following the Loew’s holding that “to be illegal is a refusal to 
license one or more copyrights unless another copyright is accepted”163 in the 
context of music would have resulted in a developmental halt of the recording 
industry that instead boomed with the advent of the long-playing record. A lack of 
action by the Department of Justice during the Album Era may indicate that it, 
too, saw through the Court’s overbroad language as being intended for the film 
industry’s practices alone. 
The carelessness with the Court’s verbiage and the scope of its holdings 
notwithstanding, these decisions nevertheless reflect the Court’s general belief that 
consumer desires are generally better served by an à la carte option of copyright 
consumption. The current digital music marketplace, where single-song sales far 
outsell albums, validates this belief. Today’s market reveals that customers, if given 
the option of picking songs one at a time or buying them in contrived bundles, 
prefer the former. Thus, the celestial jukebox—as implemented by the iTunes 
Store, the Amazon MP3 store, and other vendors—has effectively corrected the 
market imbalance created by the recording industry’s insistence on making the 
long-playing album “the thing” for the five decades following its baby boom 
advent. 
Nevertheless, the digital era has not fully obviated cause for antitrust 
questions in the recording and motion picture and TV industries. Block booking 
remains in practice, although in more muted forms. Most akin to the practices 
prohibited in the block-booking decisions, certain films are unavailable at retail 
except as parts of collections of films. For example, the 1984 documentary feature 
Terror in the Aisles is only available for purchase on Blu-ray as part of the “30th 
Anniversary Edition” of Halloween II;164 for global cinephiles, the films comprising 
Roberto Rossellini’s War Trilogy are currently only available as part of a 
collection;165 and fans of American films must purchase the 24-film/20-disc Ford 
 
163. Paramount, 334 U.S. at 159. 
164. See Halloween II (product listing), AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Halloween-30th-
Anniversary-Edition-Blu-ray/dp/B0058S0OMS (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
165. See Roberto Rossellini’s War Trilogy (product listing), AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/ 
Roberto-Rossellinis-Trilogy-Criterion-Collection/dp/B002U6DVQ2 (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
UCILR V2I3 Assembled v8 (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2012  5:35 PM 
2012] THE LONG-PLAYING BLUES 1077 
 
at Fox megaset to lay hands on individual John Ford films like Four Men and a 
Prayer, Tobacco Road, and Seas Beneath.166 Similarly, the inclusion of copyrighted 
“value added” content to films on DVD and Blu-ray, such as “making of” 
documentaries and other bonus features, when viewed through the lens of block 
booking, could support consumer claims that they are being forced to accept 
unwanted copyrights along with the desired ones that motivated the purchase. 
Studios could use these additional features to inflate the price of their films to 
consumers at retail.167 Finally, it could be argued that the bundling of cable 
channels is block booking in disguise: to the extent that the purpose of channels is 
to deliver copyrighted content, compelling consumer acceptance of a bundle of 
potentially unwanted channels is only a step removed from cable providers’ 
conditioning the license of certain copyrighted works upon acceptance of other, 
potentially unwanted, works.168 
Meanwhile, the modern recording industry is still grappling with the 
postdigital marketplace, where survival demands more than selling “just” songs.169 
When the democratization of the media landscape (thanks to the Internet) meets 
the democratization of music production (thanks to ProTools or Apple’s Garage 
Band), it seems that competition for the ears of listeners may be more robust than 
ever before. But for the corporate interests that defined the recording industry in 
the second half of the twentieth century when album sales led to record profits, 
the challenge seems to be no longer for market dominance, but rather for 
relevance in a postdigital age. 
  
 
166. See Ford at Fox—The Collection (product listing), AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/ 
Ford-At-Fox-The-Collection/dp/B000WMA6HI (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
167. Note, however, that here the question of whether there is an independent market for the 
value added content may shield studios from antitrust condemnation, in that a court could determine 
that because there is no separate consumer market for such material, there is no tying under the 
Jefferson Parish test discussed above. 
168. For a fuller discussion about questions surrounding cable channel bundling, see, for 
example, Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 
1706–10 (2003). 
169. See Timothy B. Lee, Why We Shouldn’t Worry About the Decline of the Music Industry ( Jan. 30, 
2012), FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/sites/timothylee/2012/01/30/why-we-shouldnt-worry-about-
the-decline-of-the-music-industry. 
